

































































 Philosophy in the 20th Century is usually character-
ized in terms of the linguistic turn, language being a 
central topic that cuts across very different philosoph-
ical schools (Continental vs Analytic, Phenomenology/
Hermeneutic vs Structuralism and Post-Structuralism, 
etc.). Yet, looking at its major philosophical, scientific 
and literal works, we may as well speak of a temporal turn to describe the movement 
of thinking throughout the century. From Bergson’s Creative Evolution to Heidegger’s 
Being and Time, from Einstein’s theories of relativity to Prior’s temporal logic, from 
Proust to Borges, the engagement with time is ubiquitous from the beginning to the 
end of the Century, tracing an alternative line of thought that runs parallel to that of 
the engagement with language. And, in fact, this line becomes even more visible and 
important now, from the perspective of the 21st Century where the linguistic turn 
seems to have been put aside and the topic of time is even more on the rise. In the last 
years, publications on the topic have been literally exploding, not just in metaphysics 
and philosophy of science, but also in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of action, 
in ethics, and aesthetics. 
This raising interest in the topic of time may have one of its important roots 
in the pervasive feeling that contemporary life has a serious problem with time, hav-
ing made this the scarcest of all resources. Already Heidegger complained against 
the fact that the rhythm of modern life is dictated by a permanent lack of time 
(Heidegger 1983, 115). Over the course of the last century and especially towards the 
end, through the digital revolution, this experience has been pushed to an extreme. 
Recurrent talk of acceleration, of temporal disintegration, and of dysinchronicity tes-
tify to the fact that something has changed drastically in our relationship to time, cre-
ating a sense of loss and impotence. 1 Traditional ways 
of experiencing, thinking, and organizing time that held 
for centuries seem no longer available. The result is that 
we feel as much disconnected from the past as we do 
from the present and the future. We have been long 
shipwrecking in the raging river of modern times. Given 
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this permeating feeling that we have somehow lost time, it is not surprising that so 
many philosophical works engages with such topic. As if the loss could be somehow 
compensated by thinking and the raging river be brought to rest in the vast number 
of books and publications on the topic. 
Metaphors besides, re-thinking time and our relation to it seem to have be-
come a matter of both theoretical and practical necessity. And the relation between 
time and the continuum is particularly relevant here. Then, as philosopher Byung-
Chul Han points out, contemporary life is characterized by an ineradicable disconti-
nuity (Han 2017). The 20th century has experienced the radical break from the past 
as well as the decline of utopian visions of the future. This has left us with an isolat-
ed present with no great temporal breath. Moreover, such discontinuity does not only 
shape the experience of history, it is also entrenched in our everyday life. Due to the 
strict regimentation of work and leisure, we often seem to experience our time as a 
sequence of disconnected events, appointments and achievements. This leaves little 
space for temporal breath, thus for an experience of duration. It makes any form of 
dwelling, resting and lingering difficult. 2 Precisely in the 
light of such developments, it appears particularly rele-
vant to reflect upon the concept of temporal continui-
ty. What does it mean for time to be continuous? Does 
the passage of time imply some sort of continuity that 
holds past, present and future together? Or, is time re-
ally just a sequence of disconnected events? In fact, developing the right concept of 
temporal continuity is a necessary condition for understanding any experience of du-
ration and persistence, hence for thinking (and re-thinking) our relationship to time.
From a purely theoretical perspective, the concept of temporal continuity 
is problematic mainly for one reason. In contrast to space, time is intimately connect-
ed to change and appears therefore irreducibly dynamical. Temporal change seem to 
imply more than the simple distribution of difference in a pre-given space. It seems 
to imply a genuine coming-to-be and a genuine passing-by. This raises a fundamen-
tal question: How can time be conceived as being both something continuous, hence 
extensive, and passing?
The current issue of Philosophy Kitchen investigates the notion of tempo‑
ral continuity by grappling with these questions from a genuine philosophical per-
spective. We do not think that such questions can be settled by mathematical theo-
ries of the continuum or by physical notions of time alone. They require philosophical 
reflection about the way we experience time and we think of ourselves in the world. 
Only by addressing these questions at this level can we make sense of our experience 
and thus rethink our relationship to time.
More specifically, the aim of the issue is to show the relevance of the topic 
of the temporal continuity for the contemporary philosophy of time in its different 
strands. Especially in the context of analytic philosophy of time, the orthodoxy is to 
presuppose a mathematical conception of the continuum that goes back to Georg 
Cantor. Whether such a conception is apt to capture the nature of time is hardly dis-
cussed. Thus, the issue wants to bring to attention some problems that such concep-
tion may lead to. It wants to discuss possible solutions as well as considering alterna-
tive conceptions of the continuum from the history of philosophy and mathematics 
which may be better apt to capture the dynamical nature of time.
In what follows I’ll first sketch some important stages in the history of the 
concept of the continuum to show how the contemporary orthodoxy to think about 
continuity emerged. The second part discusses the continuum in relationship to time. 
2 Codermatz’s contribution to this 
issue analyses how psychologi-
cal disorders such as schizophre-
nia are intimately related to a dis-



































































I’ll point at some questions the Cantorean definition of continuity raises in connection 
to three different debates in the philosophy of time: the nature of temporal passage, the 
meaning of temporal existence, and the ontological status of processes. This will pro-
vide some background for the papers published in this issue, as well as giving a gener-
al motivation for why the question about temporal continuity is of crucial importance.
I. The Continuum: A Brief History of the Concept
The concept of the Continuum has a very long history, going back to Zeno’s paradoxes, 
hence to the very origin of western philosophy. From then onward, the problems that 
Zeno’s paradoxes raised have been discussed in very different forms by philosophy, 
mathematics, and the natural science. Whereas mathematicians focused on the con-
tinuum to develop a formal definition of the real numbers, scientists addressed Zeno’s 
paradoxes in the context of a treatment of movement, time and space. Philosophers 
grappled with both approaches, trying to reflect on their ontological and metaphysi-
cal implications.This variety of different perspectives and questions makes it very dif-
ficult, in fact impossible, to trace a single history of the concept. We may rather speak 
of histories of the Continuum, some of which are interconnected, others which re-
main independent of one another. 
In the light of such a plurality of histories, here I will concentrate on a few 
important moments that allow for telling one consistent narrative about the devel-
opment of the concept, a narrative that is in no way exhausting or inescapable. This 
narrative will mainly concern the abstract concept of the Continuum, independently 
of whether the continuity of space, time, or change is at issue.
The first important stage in this history of the concept is Aristotle’s en-
gagement with Zeno’s paradoxes of motion in the Physics. Zeno had tried to demon-
strate the non-existence of motion by showing that it-
can be neither infinitely nor finitely divisible. 3 To avoid 
Zeno’s conclusion, Aristotle developed a detailed analy-
sis of the notion of continuity. Central to this analysis 
is a top-down approach according to which the contin-
uum is an undivided whole given prior to its (possible) 
parts. For Aristotle, parts merely are the result of a pro-
cess of dividing that can be repeated ad infinitum (Phy. 231b15). From this, Aristotle 
inferred that indivisible points are neither actual nor potential parts of the continuum. 
However often the continuum is divided, the process of division never leads to points. 
Since all potential parts of the continuum exist only as a result of a process of division, 
points cannot be parts of the continuum. Points exist only as potential boundaries 
of continuous parts. They do not have any independ-
ent existence. 4 When applied to time, Aristotle’s under-
standing of the continuum has many consequences. Is 
time continuous, so it follows that no temporal instant 
has an immediate successor. For, instants only exist as 
boundaries of temporal intervals. Accordingly, time is 
understood as that which passes continuously between 
any two instants, not as a sequence of extensionless 
instants. 5
This conception of the continuum togeth-
er with Aristotle’s understanding of the infinite have 
set the framework for all later developments of the 
3 Zeno’s paradoxes have only sur-
vived in Aristotle’s formulation 
in the Physics. See Aristotle Phy, 
239b-240a. For a general discus-
sion of the paradoxes, see the con-
tributions in Salmon (1970).
4 A classical interpretation of 
Aristotle’s account of continuity is 
Wieland (1962, 278-325). For a more 
recent analysis of this account in 
comparison with contemporary 
mathematics, see White (1994).
5 This particular understanding of 
continuity leads to a series of puz-
zles about the nature and the status 
of time, which Aristotle attempts to 
solve in Book 4 of the Physics. See 
Coope (2008) for a recent interpre-
tation of Aristotle’s solution sen-



































































concept. In the 14th Century, Aristotle’s conception of the continuum became ob-
ject of an intensive debate. William of Ockham proposed a view of the continuum 
that in some respects departed from the Aristotelian 
view and anticipated later mathematical develop-
ments. 6 Thomas Bradwardine argued at length for the 
Aristotelian thesis that continua could not be made 
out of indivisible parts (see Bell 2013). Furthermore, 
in the 15th Century, Nicholas of Cues developed an account of the actual infinite 
which became prominent in the later mathematical description of the continuum 
by Cantorean set theory (see Moore 1990, 55-56).With the rise of modern science 
and the invention of the differential calculus, discussions about the continuum took 
a new turn. Developed independently by Newton and Leibniz, the calculus allowed 
the calculation of instantaneous quantities such as velocity by making use of in-
finitesimals. These are infinitely small quantities and therefore presuppose a con-
ception of the actual infinite. Moreover, they make possible a new understanding 
of the continuum where it is constituted of infinitely small indivisible sections. For 
this reason, their introduction was an important step towards the abandonment 
of the Aristotelian framework and became the sub-
ject of numerous controversies. 7 It was only with the 
birth of set-theory at the end of the 19th Century that 
these controversies were (partly) resolved, as a formal 
treatment of the actual infinite put forward by Cantor.
During the 18th, Immanuel Kant’s understanding of the Continuum is still 
essentially Aristotelian. Like Aristotle Kant considered continuous magnitudes to 
have extended parts only, points being no parts of continua but only limits (Kant 
1781/87, A169/B211). He did not break with such a definition, as later mathematician 
would do. Nonetheless, Kant still represents an important point within the history 
of the Continuum. For, Kant related the continuity of space and time to their being 
intuitions rather than concepts. According to the arguments of the Transcendental 
Aesthetics in the Critique of Pure Reason, the continuous nature of space and time 
is nothing that can be grasped on conceptual grounds alone. It requires an intuition, 
a singular immediate presentation of its object (Kant 1781/87, A32/B47). Thus, Kant 
established an important distinction between intuitional and formal/conceptual ac-
counts of the Continuum, which would be later taken 
up by different philosophers and mathematicians in re-
acting to Cantor. 8
It is difficult to overestimate the importance 
of the works of Georg Cantor at the end of the 19th 
Century. At least from a mathematical perspective, 
these present the most important development in the 
history of the Continuum since Aristotle, set theory 
having become the foundation for doing and under-
standing modern mathematics and physics. However, 
not only because of this are such works philosophically relevant. They also have led 
to a radically new way of thinking about infinity and the Continuum.
In a nutshell, Cantor’s account is based on the identification of the Continuum 
with the structure of the real numbers. According to this identification, the set of the 
real numbers is isomorphic to the set of potential points of dividing a line in space. 
Thus, the Continuum is no longer seen as an irreducible concept, but it is identified 
with a certain set of points. Cantor developed a definition of such a set through a 
6 For a reconstruction of 
Ockham’s view, see Roques 
(2017a). See also Roques 
(2017b) and Bell (2013, Sec. 3).
7 For a good discussion of the 
calculus in connection with 
both the infinite and the contin-
uum, see Moore (1990, 57-74).
8 In the context of Kant’s under-
standing of the Continuum it is 
important to mention the works of 
Gerold Prauss. Prauss argues that 
Kant’s understanding of time pre-
sents elements of a radically new 
conception of continuity (Prauss 
2001). Starting from Kant, Prauss 
works out such a conception, criti-
cizing both Aristotle’s and Cantor’s 



































































formal construction of the reals. 9 These constructions 
deliver a purely algebraic definition of a continuous line 
freed from any geometric intuition. This definition re-
quires the concept of the actual infinite developed by 
Cantor’s theory of transfinite numbers. Thanks to this, 
the continuum could be identified with an actual (un-
countable) infinity of points satisfying certain properties (see Moore 1990, 110-122).
This new approach to the continuum breaks radically from the Aristotelian under-
standing of both the continuum and the infinite, as well as from our everyday intui-
tion. For this reason, it received numerous critiques from philosophers and mathema-
ticians at the beginning of the 20th Century. The pragmatist philosopher and logician 
C.S. Peirce defended an Aristotelian approach of the Continuum against the set-theo-
retic one (Peirce 1992). Similarly, the mathematician L.E.J. Brouwer took the intuition 
of the temporal continuum as the basis for a constructivist account of real numbers 
(Brouwer 1975). Herman Weyl argued for the impossibility of any formal definition of 
the Continuum to match entirely with our intuitions (Weyl 1987).
Parallel to this controversy in the context of the foundation of mathematics, 
the beginning of the 20th Century saw the rise of phenomenology. Edmund Husserl 
engaged directly with the Cantorean set-theoretic account of the Continuum. His 
phenomenological approach led him to emphasize the priority of an intuitive account 
of the Continuum over any formal, mathematical treat-
ment of it. 10 Thus, Husserl followed Kant in emphasiz-
ing a dichotomy between intuitional and conceptual ac-
counts of the continuum. Moreover, Husserl argued for 
the phenomenological fundamentality of time, thus as-
cribing a central role to temporal continuity in the con-
stitution of intentionality. Another important thinker of the beginning of the 20th 
Century is Henri Bergson. Bergson did not only insist on the profound differences be-
tween our intuition of the continuum and any conceptual description of it but also 
emphasized the dynamic nature of time. On this basis, he rejected any attempt to 
model the continuity of time with a spatial line. Independently of whether such a line 
is given through geometrical intuition or described conceptually, it is static. It is there-
fore not suitable for understanding the continuity of time. By the notion of a qualita-
tive multiplicity, Bergson tried to develop an alternative conception of the Continuum 
to reconcile the dynamical nature of time with its con-
tinuity. 11 Given that the distinction between temporal 
and spatial continuity is a recurring topic in this issue, 
this makes Bergson particularly relevant. 12
Despite these controversies, during the 20th 
Century Cantor’s account of the Continuum became 
the standard framework to think about continuity. This 
holds not just for the continuity of space, which was 
the focus of Cantor’s works, but also for the continuity 
of time and change. Motivated by a general skepticism 
towards intuition, the rise of formal methods in mathe-
matics, philosophy and physics certainly contributed to 
the establishment of such a framework. Cantor’s defi-
nition of the Continuum delivered a solution to Zeno’s 
paradoxes that was formally correct and therefore, as 
many philosophers argued, satisfactory. 
9 Cantor constructed the reals by 
using fundamental sequences, 
whereas Dedekind devel-
oped a more intuitive con-
struction based on so-called 
Dedekind’s cuts. See Bell (2013).
10 For a discussion of Husserl’s 
engagement with Cantor and 
of his understanding of the 
Continuum, see Tarditi’s con-
tribution to this volume.
11 As above suggested, such a dis-
tinction can be already found in 
Kant. Even Aristotle in some pas-
sages of the Physics seems to sug-
gest that there may be crucial dif-
ferences between temporal and 
spatial continuity, see the Interview 
with Tom Crowther in this vol-
ume. For a comparison between 
Bergson and Aristotle’s concep-
tion of time, see de Lándazuri’s 
contribution to this issue.
12 In this context it is also impor-
tant to mention the works of 
William James and Alfred North 
Whitehead. James’ concep-
tion of the stream of conscious-
ness ascribed a central role to 
temporal continuity. See James 
(1981, 148) where James intro-



































































II. The Continuum and the Contemporary 
Philosophy of Time
At this stage we can now turn to the specific question of 
temporal continuity. How should the continuity of time 
be understood? As I have suggested above, the ortho-
doxy in the contemporary philosophy of time is to take 
Cantor’s definition for granted. 13 Even if Cantor’s origi-
nal intent was to develop an algebraic equivalent of the 
spatial continuum, his identification of the continuum 
with the set of the real numbers can be and has been 
applied to time. To do this, it is necessary to map the real 
numbers with instants of time. The total order on R given by “<” corresponds to the 
order of temporal instants according to the relation of 
“before-than”. 14 Density here means that each interval 
of time can be further partitioned into smaller intervals. 
Lastly completeness means that each instant of time 
represents the common boundary of past and future. In 
this section I want to show that such an assumption is 
problematic and therefore requires further discussion. 
To do so, I will focus on three debates in analytic phi-
losophy related to time. The claim is going to be that the Cantorean definition of the 
Continuum raises a series of questions, at least for those views which emphasize the 
dynamic nature of time. 
The first important debate in the contemporary philosophy of time con-
cerns the question about the fundamentality of temporal becoming and goes back 
to McTaggart’s distinction between two series of time (see McTaggart 1909). The 
A-series determined by past, present and future, the B-series determined by the 
binary relations after-than, before-than and simultaneous-with. Based on this dis-
tinction, the A-Theory argues that the A-series marks fundamental aspects of re-
ality. Tensed temporal determinations such as “present”, “past” and “future” relate 
to aspects of the world which are fundamental and thus irreducible. This implies 
a commitment to the reality of temporal becoming. Time passes in a way which 
differs radically from the distribution of difference in 
space. It implies things becoming present. 15 In con-
trast to the A-Theory, the B-Theory rejects the funda-
mentality of the A-Series. According to the B-Theory. 
The tensed determinations are considered as merely 
indexical linguistic devices through which we relate to 
a tenseless world. They do not pick out real properties 
of things but rather reflect our subjective perspective 
on the world. 
The second debate is intimately related to 
the first one, it concerns the notion of temporal ex-
istence. How precisely such debate should be under-
stood is a matter of numerous controversies. 16 As a 
first approximation, it can be understood as address-
ing the following question: What kind of things exists? 
Do past and future things exist? Eternalism is the view 
according to which to exist in time is to be located at 
(1930, 181-3) where James explic-
itly engages with Cantor’s concep-
tion of the continuum. On the other 
hand, Whitehead denied the con-
tinuity of becoming on the basis 
of Zeno’s paradoxes. He famously 
argued that «There is a becoming 
of continuity, but no continuity of 
becoming». (Whitehead 1978, 35).
13 The application of Cantor’s defi-
nition of the continuum to time 
goes back to Russell (1914) and 
has been developed system-
atically in Grünbaum (1973).
14 One does not need to apply this 
to a universal order. The model can 
also be applied within the con-
text of the Theory of Relativity. In 
this case, it suffices to identify 
a local ordering of events along 
a world-line. See for instance 
Grünbaum (1973), 326-8).
15 The standard formulation of 
the eternalist (new) B-Theory of 
Time goes back to Mellor (1998). 
For a defence of the Moving 
Spotlight Theory (MST) see Deasy 
(2015) as well as Marques’ con-
tribution to this volume; for the 
Growing Block Theory (GBT), 
see Correia & Rosenkranz (2018); 
at last, for presentism see, e.g. 
Friebe (2012). For an overall view 
of the debate see Fischer (2013).
16 In the last few years, some 
authors call for a reformulation of 
the controversy in terms of the dis-
tinction between permanentism 
and temporarysm. (Williamson, 
2013; Deasy, 2017; Correia/
Rosenkranz 2018). Here I will stick 



































































some instant of the entire spatio-temporal block. Thus, 
according to eternalists past and future things exist 
as much as present things do. On the other hand, pre-
sentism emphasizes the relation between existen-
ce and presentness. Thus, presentists hold that only present objects exist. Insofar 
as “present” is a tensed expression, presentism presupposes the A-Theory of time. 
While the A-Theory assumes that the present is a fundamental aspect of reality, 
presentism specififies such fundamentality in ontological terms. The fundamentali-
ty of the present is the fundamentality of existence. Further views in the debate are 
the growing block theory, according to which the present and the past equally ex-
ist and the moving spotlight theory, which combines eternalism with an A-Theory 
of time. 
In the light of these two debates, Cantor’s 
definition of the Continuum raises a series of ques-
tion. First, it is not clear how this understanding of the 
Continuum could be compatible with presentism. 17 
Insofar as it presupposes an actual infinite of distinct 
temporal points, the Cantor’s Continuum seems to 
imply a commitment to eternalism. 18 Moreover, the 
model only describes the continuity of temporal or-
der. It leaves out any sense in which temporal becom-
ing as the motion/direction of the present may be con-
tinuous. Hence, the challenge of reconciling this model 
with the dynamical nature of time seems to hold for 
any A-Theory. 19 Different alternatives are open. One 
may argue that dynamic theories of time such as 
Presentism should develop a different understanding 
of temporal continuity, thus the importance of looking 
at the history of philosophy and mathematics for al-
ternative conceptions of the Continuum. Another pos-
sibility here would be to reject temporal continuity in 
toto by claiming that time is not continuous. Some re-
cent developments in physics seem to point in this di-
rection. 20 This nonetheless raises a series of further 
questions concerning the extension of the present and 
its elapse. 21 Moreover, it is not clear how the physical 
discreteness of time should be addressed philosophi-
cally. Even if physical time consists of indivisible tem-
poral intervals, dynamic theories could still be arguing that time passes within such 
intervals. The third important debate does not concern time as such but a specif-
ic class of temporal entities, namely processes. A lot of work has been recently de-
voted to the logic of aspects and to the difference between the progressive and the 
perfective. 
Consider for instance the sentence in the progressive: “Marcel is writing 
his last book”. Such sentence describes an occurrence as it is unfolding. In contrast, 
the sentence in the corresponding perfective form “Marcel has written his last book” 
describes an action in the past that has come to an end. It is possible for the sen-
tence in the progressive to be true without the sentence in the perfective ever being 
true. Marcel may be writing his last book without ever the complete event of Marcel’s 
writing of his last book been instantiated. Marcel’s writing of his last book could be 
The claims concerning tempo-
ral continuity apply to perma-
nentism and temporaryism as well.
17 Bourne (2009) is an exam-
ple of a presentist who presup-
poses Cantor’s definition of the 
Continuum (see for instance p. 55).
18 In fact, it presupposes an 
uncountable infinity of points 
corresponding to the cardinal-
ity of the real numbers. That the 
infinity is uncountable is how-
ever not relevant here. The cen-
tral problem is that continuity is 
understood as a property of a set 
that has more than one point.
19 Both Friebe and Yechimovitz 
argue in this volume that the 
Growing Block Theory of Time 
has a problem with temporal con-
tinuity. In contrast, Orilia pre-
sents a version of presentism 
called substantivalist presen-
tism that is compatible with 
Cantor’s definition of continuity.
20 Rovelli argues for the dis-
creteness of time on the basis of 
recent developments in Quantum 
Mechanics, see Rovelli (2018).
21 For a discussion of such 




































































interrupted, for instance by his sudden death. 
Reflection on similar examples has led some philosophers to draw an im-
portant distinction between events and processes. 22 In 
contrast to spatio-temporally bounded events, process-
es are understood as incomplete, extending temporal 
entities. They are the ontological correspondent to the 
linguistic progressive aspect. This in turn means that 
processes are essentially continuous. Their unfolding is 
continuous in the sense of being always further extend-
able and at any point divisible. However, it is hard to see 
how the Cantorean conception of the Continuum could 
help understand this kind of continuity. Such an un-
derstanding presupposes then an actually infinite set 
of points, thus it describes a structure that is devoid of 
any incompleteness. 23 Hence, a different understand-
ing of temporal continuity may here help to shed light 
on the nature of processes.All these considerations lead 
to the fundamental question of the volume: How can 
time be conceived simultaneously as something contin-
uous, hence extensive, and passing? They suggest that 
this question cannot be settled by appealing to Cantor’s 
formal definition of the Continuum alone. Be it in the 
context of the debate about temporal passage, about 
temporal existence or about the ontological status of 
change, views which hold onto some robust sense of 
becoming seem all to be requiring a more dynamic ac-
count of the continuity of time that is not delivered by 
Cantor’s.
22 For a systematic study of 
the logic of aspects see Galton 
(1984). Thompson (2008) has 
emphasized the importance of 
such distinction for action the-
ory. O’Schaugnessy (2000) and 
Soteriou (2018) do the same for 
the philosophy of mind. They argue 
that experience is a process, by 
necessity. There are different 
ways in which the ontological sta-
tus processes can be understood, 
see Stout (2016) and Crowther 
(2018) for two opposing views.
23 In discussions about proces-
ses and the progressive, Aristotle’s 
definition of the continuum has 
been recently rediscovered. See for 
instance Rödl (2005, 166-172) and 
Arsenijevic (2007). A further, here 
related issue concerns the prob-
lem of the first moment of change. 
This problem arises when one con-
siders the beginning of change 
and is therefore intimately related 
with the continuity of time and 
change. See Strobach (1998) for a 
systematic history of such prob-
lem as well as Fischer’s contri-
bution to this volume, where dis-
positions and processes are 
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